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, IN THE SUPREME CO·URT 
~ OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL A. LONG, wife of ) 
WILLIAM T. LONG, deceased, 
WESTERN .STA~~s RE::;:~t, \ N~a;:67 
CO. and the .STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPLICANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Applicant filed an application on April12, 1961, with 
the Industrial Commission of Utah for recovery on an 
industrial accident claim arising out of the death of 
applicant's husband, William T. Long. The claim was 
denied by the State Insurance Fund, and as a result 
of the denial of the claim a hearing on the application 
took place before Roland G. Robinson, Jr., referee for 
the Industrial Commis,sion. The notice of the hearing 
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specifically noted that ther·e would he no medical testi-
mony given in this hearing. At the beginning of the 
hearing the referee advised the parties that ''there 
will he no medical testimony given at this hearing." 
The only que.stion considered was ''whether the alleged 
injury occurred within the scope of employment of the 
deceased.'' 
Pearl A. Long, your petitioner, will hereinafter be 
designated as ''Applicant.'' The employer of William T. 
Long, deceased, Western States Refining Company and 
the State Insurance Fund will hereinafter he collectively 
designated as '' def·endants.'' 
DISPOSITION BEFORE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The referee after hearing the testimony of witnesses 
for both sides and after having ·considered the informa-
tion submitted in reports and letters, made recommended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which the 
Industrial Commission adopted whereby applicant's 
claim was denied bUtsed on a finding ' 'that no competent 
evidence was presented to support the claim of appli-
cant that the death of deceased resulted by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment." 
(R. 62 and 63) 
A motion for Re-Hearing was timely filed. Nearly 
a year thereafter the Industrial Commission requested 
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information concerning newly discovered material evi-
dence. (R. 67) In reply, counsel for Applicant described 
the nature of this evidence and reasons why it was not 
availa:Ole at the early hearing. (R. 64 and 65) The motion 
~ for rehearing was denied without reasons ·stated there-
for. (R. 71) 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN PETITION 
The Applicant seeks a review of the findings of 
the Industrial Commission to determine whether or not 
it acted without or in excess of its powers and for the 
further reason that the findings of fact do not support 
the award or denial under review. If this court deter-
mines that the findings of fact are not supported by 
the evidence in the record your Applicant requests relief 
as follows: 
1. The Order of the Commission be vacated and 
set aside and the cause be remanded to the Industrial 
Commission with instructions to find that as a matter 
of law Applicant is entitled to compensation in accord-
ance with the Workmen's Compensation Law of this 
state, or 
2. The ·Cause be remanded to hte Industrial Com-
mission for rehearing in order to permit Applicant the 
opportunity to present further and newly discovered 
evidence on the question of accidental death of William 
T. Long, ari·sing out of or in the course of his em-
ployment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. William T. Long, deceased, was employed by 
the Western States Refining Company (aka, Beeline 
Refining Company) as a truck driver (R. 14, 15) His 
duties of employment included the driving of a big tank 
truck between designated points, hauling gas condensate, 
giving this truck nominal service, i.e., daily maintenance 
and inspection and the changing of a flat tire if there 
were no available service station where it could be 
repaired. (R. 15, 16, 17 and 18) 
On the 26th day of N ovemher, 1960, the decedent 
was driving a truck in the course of his employment be-
tween Farmington, New Mexico and Thompson, Utah. 
He was directed by the Company to drive the empty 
truck to Farmington, New Mexico, load up and drive it 
to Thompson, Uta·h, where he was to empty it in rail-
road ·cars. R. 14 and 15) 
On the above date he left home in Moab, Utah, 
at about 5 o'·clock A.M. to drive to Farmington, New 
Mexico in hi.s truck (R. 21 and 22). Along the route 
decedent changed a tire on the truck for reasons not 
definitely known but reportedly due to a flat tire (R. 
1, 59). While placing the tire in the rack which was 
located underneath the trailer, the heavy tire slipped 
and hit him in the ·chest and stomach. (R. 1, 23, 24, 25, 
48). Just where along the route this accident happened 
is not known but it was before decedent had arrived 
at Cahone, Colorado. (R. 26). After the accident, de-
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cedent drove his truck to Cahone, Colorado where he 
parked it and wa·s taken to the hospital in Cortez, 
Colorado. (R. 22, 26, 46·). Mr. Long remained ex-
tremely ill in the hospital at Cortez, Colorado until the 
day of his death, D·ecemher 10, 1961. (R. 27, 28). He wllis 
so ill, in fact, that he didn't talk very much. (R. 24). 
When decedent left home on the 26th day of November, 
1960, to drive the truck to Farmington, New Mexico, he 
app~ared to be w·ell and planned on returning that day 
to take hi,s wife fishing. The general -condition of his 
health prior to this accident was very good. (R. 28). 
ARGUMENT 
THE IND·USTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD 
HAVE RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
APPLICANT WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ON 
HER CLAIM. 
While it is a recognized principle of the law in 
Workmen's Compensation cases in this state that this 
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the 
Commissioners, however, in reviewing a decision of the 
Industrial Commission, this court has the authority 
to determine if there [s in the record such evidence 
as to render legal support to the finding of the Com-
mission. Bain vs. Industrial Com.mission, 199 P. 666; 
Utah Consolidated Mining Company vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 240 P. 440; Parker vs. Industrial Commissio-n, 
5 P.2d 573; Park City vs. Industrial Commission, 224 
P. 655. Furthermore, this court, in reviewing the find-
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ings of the Commission, has authority to inquire into 
the question of whether or not the commission in deny-
ing compensation ha·s aribtrarily or capriciously dis-
regarded uncontradicted evidence. J( elly vs. I ndu.strial 
Commission, 12 P .2d 1112; Kent vs. Industrial C omwis-
sion, 57 P .2nd 724. 
It may be further .stated that where the evidence is 
uncontradicted and credible and the Industrial Commis-
sion refuses to award compensation because of insuffi-
ciency of evidence to sustain 'burden of proof, a question 
of law is presented for this court to determine. Harness 
vs. Industrial Commission, 17 P.2d 277; Ostler vs. In-
dustrial Co'YYilmission, 36 P.2d 9·5; Wherritt vs. Indu.strial 
Commission, 110 P.2d 374; Woodburn vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 181 P.2d 209, 212. 
In a recent decision by this court it was stated: 
''The law does not inve.st the Commission with any such 
arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontra-
dicted, ·competent, credible evidence ... '' Jones vs. CaU-
fornia Packvn,g Corp., 244 P.2d ·644. The court in the 
Jones case on page 644 went on to state : 
''If the Commission could go so far as to 
refuse to believe such evidence, in the absence of 
anything of substance to refute it, then it cer-
tainly would posses·s arbitrary powers with no 
effective review 1eft available to the litigant.'' 
The evidence before the Commission as .shown by 
the record in the instant case reveals that the employer 
of decedent Long clearly recognized the fact that de-
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cedent while employed in driving its truck encountered 
tire trouble on the road and it was aft·er changing the 
tire and placing it in the rack that it slipped hitting 
dece-dent in the chest and ,stomach causing unknown 
injury;- that immediately thereafter decedent became 
aware of severe pain in stomach and chest. This report 
was never questioned by the ·employer as being inaccu-
rate, although the information was submitted by the wife 
of qece9:enJ. It W8Js, therefore,. competent ·evidence that 
the ·employee was injured by reason of an accident and 
that the accident arose out of and in the course of 
·emplo~ent. Mid-City Iron and Metal Company vs. 
Turner, 165 N.E. 760; the testimony of Applicant clearly 
show.s that decedent was very, very ill when Applicant 
arrived at the hospital; that decedent didn't talk very 
much but did e:x:plain to Applicant that while placing 
a tire in the rack it slipped striking him in the stomach, 
after which he felt severe pain in his chest and became 
extremely ill. It is clear from the record that the referee 
disregarded the te,stimony of Applicant on the ground 
that it was hearsay. Under the relaxed rules of evidence 
befo1·e the Commission, (35-1-88 U.C.A. 1953) the referee 
acted arbitrarily in discrediting Applicant's testimony 
·particularly in view ·of the fact that there was not one 
scintilla of evidence presented to show that decedent 
died of causes other than those testified to by Mr. Day 
and Mr,s. Long. Under the ruling of the case of James vs. 
California Packing Corp., supra, the referee applied his 
own expert knowledge to the problem presented to him 
and used this "in lieu of or against the evidence intro-
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duced. '' The Industrial Commission thereafter adopted 
the referee's recommended findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. 
There is also a long line of authority which holds 
''that the W orkn}en 's Compensa;tion Act should be 
liberally construed to effectuate its purposes, and where 
there i·s doubt, it should be re.solved in favor of coverage 
of the employee. Jones vs. Califorwia Packing Corp., 
supra. In the case of Park Utah Consolidated Mines 
Company vs. Indu.strial Commission, 36 P.2d 979, Judge 
McConkie in rendering the unanimous deci·sion of this 
court gave an excellent history and purpo,se of the 
Workmen's Compensation Laws. He .stated: 
''The act affords, through administrative 
bodies, injured industrial workmen or their de-
pendents simple, adequate and speedy means of 
~securing compensation ... to the end that the 
'co,st of human wreckage may he taxed against 
the industry which employes it' ... which tax 
or burden is added to the price of the produce 
and is ultimately paid by the consumer.'' 
He goes on to say, 
''If there is any doubt respecting eo:mpensa-
tion, such doubt should be resolved in favor of 
the employee or his dependents, as the case may 
be.'' 
Thi,s eourt has in numerous cases ~Since the Park 
Utah Consolidated Mines case, supra, restated this rule. 
M & K Corp·oration vs. Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 
10 
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132, citing numerous cases; Jones vs. California Packing 
Co., 244 P.2d 640. 
Where, as in the case before this court, the injured 
workman is not available to te~stify, the trier of facts in 
order to fully carry out the spirit and purpose of the 
law of Workmen's Compensation should resolve the 
question of doubt in favor of the dependent of the de-
ceased employee. 
The testimony of the insurance adjuster, Joseph 
Kirkham. was entirely hearsay. It consisted of alleged 
interview;s with parties who were supposed to have seen 
and talked to decedent when he was ill and prior to 
being taken to the hospital. These alleged interviews 
took place on or about October 2, 1961, nearly one year 
after the death of Mr. Long. 
These witnesses, allegedly a Mr. Rex Perry, and a 
Mr. Harold Tanner, according to adjuster Kirkham, 
didn't recall hearing Mr. Long say anything about a 
tire falling on his chest and stomach as he tried to 
put it in the rack. This evid.ence proves nothing' one 
way o-r the other. On the other hand, the accident was 
reported to the employer immediately after the accident 
and right after the death of Long the employer made 
out the accident report 3JS shown on Page I of this 
record. Also, Dr. Hites who attended the deceased prior 
to his death prepared and .submitted a ''corrected" 
surgical report to the Industrial Commission, dated 
March 8, 19161. 
11 
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Dr. Hite,s in his report in answer to Part I, "State-
ment of Patient as to how injury was sustained," sa~s: 
''Lifting a large truck tire by himself while changing a 
flat on the road." In answer to Part 2, "Give nature and 
extent of injuries. Patient must he thoroughly examined 
for all possible injuries due to the accident, and tMs 
first report must he complete in detail,'' he state,s, 
''Acute myocardial infarction due to over exertion de-
veloped while changing truck tire by himself.'' 
On October 2, 1961, nearly one year after Mr. Long's 
death, the insurance adjuster for the Workmen's Com-
pensation carrier solicited a letter from Dr. Hites who 
now can't ~seem to recall the facts of thi;s accident or 
find any hospital record concerning them. This letter 
from Dr. Hites was admitted in evidence and given 
weight as evidence hy the referee to prove that, in fact, 
no such accident as reported by the doctor, by the 
employer and by MDs. Long ever did take place. 
For the referee and the Industrial Commission 
to ignore the weight of these official reports, and the 
testimony of Mrs. Long and to allow the flim.sy hearsay 
evidence obtained from alleged witnesses to decedent's 
pain and suffering but who didn't have personal knowl-
edge of its cause to overrule and discredit these reports 
and testimony is clearly an abuse of discretion and is 
contrary to the law. This is not a case where the Com-
mission wa~s faced with a co-nflict of the evidence. There 
just was no evidence which refuted the evidence that 
Mr. Long, as reported by the employer and the doctor 
12 
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and as testified to by Mrs. Long, died of ''an aeute 
myo.cardial infarction due to over exertion developed 
while ·changing truck tire by himself,'' and that he so 
exerted himself in the course of his employment with 
Western States Refining Company. The Commission, 
therefore, was wrong as a matter of law in refusing to 
rule in favor of your Applicant herein. 
If this court, however, finds against the position of 
Applicant on Point I, above, 'Applicant i·s entitled to a 
new hearing for the reasons stated in Point II which 
follows 
POINT II 
THE COMMIB'SION ACTED WITHOUT OR IN 
EXCESS OF TS POWERS BY REASON OF THE 
FACT THAT IT EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED MEDI-
CAL TETIMONY FROM THE HEARING. 
In the notice of the hearing sent to Applicant is a 
notation that there would be ''no medical." In light of 
the proceedings on October 16, 1961, this could only 
mean that the partie.s were previously notified, as stated 
in the beginning of that hearing, that ''There will be 
no medical testimony given at this hearing.'' 
By implication the only question on which the Com-
mission would receive evidence was such evidence of a 
non-medical nature as would either prove or disprove 
this death to he one of an accidental nature which hap-
pened in the course of the decedent's employment. There 
were no eye witnesses to the tire changing accident as 
13 
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shown by reports and as testified to by Applicant. The 
Corrnrtission refused to place sufficient credence on the 
official written reports on file in the record and the tes-
timony of Mris, Long to find in Applicant's favor. It then 
refused to allow any medical testimony to be presented 
which could have corroborated the said reports and tes-
timony. By limiting the ·scope of the hearing, the Indus-
trian Commi.ssion -exceeded its powerrs and denied Appli-
cant a full and fair hearing. If the blow to Mr. ,Long's 
·stomach and ehest took place .as shown in the record, 
medical testimony may have further substantiated this 
fact. It is difficult to understand how a professional man 
~such as Dr. Hites could have made the reports he did to 
the Industrian Commission, knowing fully the effect of 
such reports, unless at the time these reports were filed 
he had rsufficient medical information on which to base 
his findings in those reports. To refuse Applicant the 
opportunity to bring in medical testimony at the October 
16, 1961 hearing and to further deny Applicant a rehear-
ing whereby she could by medical testimony prove that 
Mr. Long suffered a severe blow to his abdomen and 
chest prior to the time he was taken to the hospital where 
he died and that this blow caused his death was clearly 
an abuse of the power vested in the Commission and the 
Oommisrsion exceeded its power.s in proceeding as it did. 
In a well known treatise of the law under the subject 
of Workmen's Compensation is found the following: 
''As claimant is entiHed to every opportunity 
to present his claim, and the opposite party to 
14 
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present his defense, each party is entitled to in-
troduce isuch relevant and material evidence as 
he may desire. Thus, claimant should he given an 
opportunity to introduce evidence of relevant and 
material facts which logically tend to prove the 
i·ssue;s involved, and are not excluded hy some rule 
of law, and it is error for the Commission to deny 
him an opportunity to present further testimony 
prior to the last and final award in the cause. 100 
C.J.S., Workmen '.s Compensation, SS 592, p. 841. 
See also Forrester v. Marland, Oklahoma, 286 P. 
302; Owatt v. Rodman's Beverage, Pa., 82 A.2d 
25·5; Bereda Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board oofil-
linois, TIL, 114 N.E. 275·; Hathcock v. Loftin, Md., 
22 A.2d 479·; Smith v. Smith, Mo., 237 S.W. 2d 84; 
Stanolind Pi.pe Line Co. v. Geurin, Okl., 19 P.2d 
139, Evans v. Industrial Accident Commission, 
Cal., 162 P.2d 488.'' 
On the basis of the record of this case and the law 
as herein cited and discussed it was a denial of due pro-
cess of law, the commission exceeded its powers and 
thereby committed reversible error when it .Jimited the 
evidence to such as was non-medical in nature. This 
court, therefore, should remand this case back to the In-
dustrial Commission for a rehearing in accordance with 
the law as set forth herein. 
The recor-d of this hearing show.s that William T. 
Long died of a heart attack caused by a heavy truck tire 
falling on his ·stomach and chest; that he was acting in 
the course of his employment when he attempted to place 
15 
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this tire in the rack. There was no evidence presented to 
refute this fact. A year after the accident, the insurance 
adjuster couldn't find any witnesses who saw the acci-
dent or recalled hearing this extremely ill employee ex-
plain how he became ill. This lack of evidence the Com-
mission accepted as tantamount to evidence that no such 
accident occurred. Such is not the law and as a matter of 
law the Commi,ssion should have awarded compensation 
to your Applicant a,s requested. 
In any event, it was a denial of due process to Ap-
plicant when the OOinmission expressly excluded from 
the hearing any ,medical testimony whatsoever, thereby 
denying Applicant the opportunity to prove through 
medical testimony what it ·claimed ,she had failed to prove 
otherwise. This is the judicial equivalent of the require-
ment to make brick's without straw. (Exodus 5). 
It is respectfully submitted that: (1) This court 
should find that Applicant i,s entitled to recover on her 
claim as a matter of law, or (2) This court ,should, remand 
the case back to the Industrial Commission for a rehear-
ing in accordance with the law as dis·cussed herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Leon A. Halgren 
Attorney for Applicant 
2574 .Sage Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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